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COMMENT.
T-E 'FOURTEENTH AMENDM4ENT AND' SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS ON REAL
ESTATE. "-- N.0RW6D V. BAIKER, 172 U. S.269
- Two cases, Harrisburg V. McPherran, 49 Alt. 988,- and White v.
Tacoma, io9 Fed. Rep. 32 involve the application of the rule that
"Assessments for improvements in streets must be no greater, sub-
stantially, than the benefits derived." In both of these decisions the
well known case:of Norwobd v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, was cited as
authority
In connection with these cases our attention is called to an article
in the Harvard Law Review, June, 190o, Vol. XIV, p.-98, by Harry
Hubbard of New York," which begins as follows: "The cases decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States down to the case of Nor-
wood v. Baker. clearly hold that- the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States does not prohibit assessments on
real estate in excess of special benefits or by methods other than ac-
cording to, specialbenefits." The writer then refers: to a number ;of
cases which in. his o0pinion are in conflict with Norwood 'v. Baker, and
comments, in closing, on the,'confusion which has arisen from misuse
of the' word assessment. We- shall now consider whether the Su-
preme Court has changed its position as to what taxes' and assess-
ments -come within- the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment
'Though it contains no clause expressly prohibiting a state from
taking private 'property, for a public use without 'making compensa-
tion, as the Fifth Amendment does in the -case of the United States,
it: has -been adjudged that, taking private property for a public use
without making -compensation is prohibited by the clause, "nor shall
any state deprive any. person of life,. liberty or property without due
process of law." ,Chicago, Bitrlington & Q. R..1?. v. Chicago, i66
U, S. 226; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn 166 :U. S.
6 8 5 . :,- c - ..... -- -- -- - I
I --The facts were-briefly these:-The village of Norwood condemned
a strip of land for a public street, and, after making compensation to
the owner;, assessed back on: her remaining land, on either. side the
amount ,of such, compensation, together- with the condemnation ex-
penses. This was in pursuance of See. 2264, Ohio- Rev. Stat., per-
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miting the village to assess the expense of -opening a street, to the
general tax list, or-to the property- abutting such street._
The Ohio constitution required the- making, of compensation and
assessing back to be in two separate proceedings. If it was assessed
against the abutting property the amount to be borne by each was to
be determined in -one of three ways: either in proportion to, theben-
efits derived, or the value of the property, or the front feet bounding
and abutting on the improvement.
The legislature has, power to declare- what shall constitute a tax-
ing districti whether a county, town, city, ward, city block Pr street.
Now,asMr. Hubbard points out, when the legislature determines
that the burden- of any general tax shall be borne by a specified tax-
ing district, all investigation, as to -benefits derived.by individuals
-within- the district is necessarily precluded, although, the. purpose for
which the tax was laid was specified. - .
A -careful examination shows that in every -case. in- which Mr.
,Hubbard claims the Supreme Court took a position contrary to that
in -Norwood v. Baker,,,the legislature had either prescribed, a taxing
district or made provision for-its prescription by the.municipality.
And in comparing those cases with Norwood v. Baker it mus 'be
borne in mind that when the legislature determines,,that the public
must incur an expense it is not a valid objection on the part of an
individual that -he-gets no benefit therefrom,
In Norwood v. Baker no district -was prescribed by- the statute.
If there had been, and the defendant was -a, landowner, Within that
district, she would have no cause of complaint though she had to pay
more than the enhanced value of her land. -But instead the council
was authorized to assess the cost on such -contiguous, and adjacent
land, and in such of the three ways above mentioned as they saw fit.
It became necessary then, under the law of special assessments,
that the owner should derive a benefit substantially equal to the as-
sessment. In enunciating the law applicable to_ these, cases the court
says: "Undoubtedly abutting, owners may be subject to-special as-
sessments to meet the expense of opening public highways in front
of their property-such assessments, according to .well established
principles, resting on the ground that special burdens -may be im-
posed --for special and peculiar benefits -accruing,-, from public
improvements." Mobile County v. Kimball, i02, U. S.: 69r. Illi-
nois Cent. R. R. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 19o. Bauman v. Ross, 167
U. S. 548.. And according to the weight of authority the legislature
has a large discretion in defining the territory to be deemed specially
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benefited by a public improvement, and which may be subjected to
special assessments to meet the cost of such improvements. In Wil-
liams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, where the only question as the
court stated was as to the power of the legislature to cast the burden
of a public improvement upon certain towns, which had been judi-
cially determined to be towns benefited by such improvement, is was
said:
"Neither can it be doubted that if the state constitution does not
prohibit, the legislature speaking generally may create a new taxing
district, determine what territory shall belong to such district, and
what property shall be considered as benefited by a proposed im-
provement. But the power of the legislature in these matters is not
unlimited. There is a point beyond which the legislative depart-
ment, even when exercising the power of taxation, may not go con-
sistently with the citizen's right of property. As already indicated,
the principle underlying special assessments to meet the cost of
public improvement is that the property upon which they are imposed
is peculiarly benefited, and therefore the owners do not, in fact, pay
anything in excess of what they receive by reason of such improve-
ment. But the guarantees for the protection of private property
would be seriously impaired, if it were established as a rule of con-
stitutional law, that the imposition of the legislature upon particular'
private property of the entire cost of a public improvement, irres-
pective of any peculiar benefits accruing to the owner from such im-
provement, could not be questioned by him in the courts of the coun-
try.
* * * * * "In our judgment the exaction from the owner
of private property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial
excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent of such
excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of private property for
public use without compensation."
It will be seen that particular private property was being assessed
specially for an improvement and not an entire taxing district as-
sessed ad valorem, such as we refer to above and with which Mr.
Hubbard has confused the present case.
It has not been adjudged that the excess of burden over benefit
is a taking of private property without compensation, when a general
or special tax is imposed on an entire district.
